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This study examines 171 brand licensing announcements and subsequent changes in the licensor firms’shareholder values using the event study method. We find that although brand licensing announcements lead
to positive abnormal returns on average, nearly 44% of the announcements in our sample are followed by
negative abnormal returns. We argue that investors react more favorably to a brand licensing announcement
when they believe (i) the brand has greater ability to stimulate licensee product sales (and thus generate higher
royalties for the licensor) and (ii) the licensor firm has greater ability to limit licensee opportunism (and thus limit
brand dilution and its adverse effect on sales of other products marketed under the brand name). In line with
our hypotheses related to a brand’s ability to stimulate licensee product sales, the study’s findings suggest
that investors react more favorably to announcements involving brands with greater brand fit and greater
brand breadth. However, investors appear to react less favorably to announcements involving brands with
higher advertising investments. In line with our hypotheses related to a licensor firm’s ability to limit licensee
opportunism, the study’s findings suggest that investors react more favorably to announcements involving larger
licensors; however, investors’ reactions do not appear to be influenced by licensor firms’ licensing experience.
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1. Introduction
Today you can don licensed Caterpillar® work boots
and cut your lawn with a licensed Scotts® lawn tractor.
Reward yourself with a fresh cup of coffee from a
Melitta® licensed coffeemaker, take your Jeep® branded
bike to the store to pick up your new Kodak® eyeglasses.
Survey your property anew and call over the licensed
Sears® contractor to fix your roof. Negotiate with your
son to clean-out your sink and toilet drains with licensed
Roto-Rooter® drain cleaning chemicals and then take
your Eddie Bauer® SUV over to Sotheby’s Real Estate®
and have them sell your house. Catch up on the news
on your new Westinghouse® HDTV, fly licensed United
Express Airlines® into the big city, have your hair cut
at the Armani® hair stylist, and spend the night at
Armani’s licensed nightclub! (Feldman et al. 2010, p. 1)
As the quote above suggests, brand licensing is
becoming increasingly pervasive in many industries.
In 2012, the top 150 global licensors received royal-
ties on licensee product sales of more than $230 bil-
lion (License! Global 2013). Brand licensing involves
a brand owner (the licensor) giving another firm (the
licensee) the right to manufacture/market its products
under the brand name. In principle, brand licensing
should create value for both the licensor and licensee:
The licensee should realize higher product sales by
leveraging consumers’ knowledge of the licensor’s
brand, whereas the licensor should realize licensing
royalties on the licensee’s product sales. Despite its
pervasiveness, however, brand licensing has received
little conceptual or empirical attention. As such, we
have limited knowledge of the actual effect of brand
licensing on a licensor firm’s shareholder value, a key
performance metric for top management (see Srinivasan
and Hanssens 2009).
On one hand, brand licensing can enhance a licen-
sor’s shareholder value by generating additional cash
flows from royalties on licensee product sales. On the
other hand, brand licensing entails the licensor ceding
control over the manufacturing/marketing of a prod-
uct with its brand name to a licensee. If the licensee
behaves opportunistically (e.g., manufactures a poor-
quality product or markets it poorly), consumers may
evaluate the branded product unfavorably and hence
think less favorably about the licensor’s brand; that is,
licensee opportunism can lead to brand dilution (see
1436
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Loken and John 1993). In turn, this is likely to have an
adverse effect on the licensor firm’s revenues from other
products marketed under the brand name, resulting
in lower cash flows. As such, when a licensor firm
cannot prevent licensee opportunism, brand licensing
can reduce its shareholder value, as suggested in a
classic case:
In 1997 Calvin Klein, Inc. licensed its brand to the
Warnaco Group for manufacturing, distribution, and
marketing of Calvin Klein jeans. By the end of 1999,
Calvin Klein had received $85 million from the Warnaco
Group (Agins and Quick 2001). That same year, however,
Calvin Klein sued Warnaco for trademark infringement
and trademark dilution. A major claim in the lawsuit
was monetary compensation for brand dilution. Between
1997 and 1999, Warnaco allegedly had altered the design
of the Calvin Klein jeans, used cheaper materials in
its manufacturing, and marketed them in warehouse
clubs such as Costco and BJ without Calvin Klein’s
permission.1
Given its potential for positive as well as negative
consequences, it is important to examine whether and
under what conditions brand licensing increases or
decreases a licensor firm’s shareholder value.
Drawing on literature on brand extensions (e.g.,
Loken et al. 2010, Völckner and Sattler 2006) and
strategic alliances (e.g., Dickson et al. 2006, Leiblein
and Madsen 2009), we build a conceptual framework
for analyzing investors’ responses to brand licens-
ing announcements. This framework suggests that
investors respond more favorably to brand licensing
announcements involving (i) brands with greater ability
to stimulate licensee product sales and (ii) licensors
with greater ability to limit licensee opportunism. Based
on this conceptual framework, we develop and test five
hypotheses using data compiled from multiple sources
including the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), AdSpender, Compustat, the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Factiva, and Securi-
ties and Exchange Committee (SEC) filings. We use the
event study method, with abnormal returns serving
as indicators of investor reactions to brand licensing
announcements (for recent applications, see Boyd et al.
2010, Raassens et al. 2012).
We find that, on average, brand licensing announce-
ments lead to significant positive abnormal returns for
licensor firms; however, nearly 44% of the announce-
ments in our sample are followed by negative abnormal
returns. Consistent with our hypotheses, the study’s
findings suggest that licensor firms’ abnormal returns
are greater when licensed brands have greater fit with
licensee products and have greater brand breadth.
However, investors appear to react less favorably to
1 Calvin Klein Trademark Trust and Calvin Klein, Inc. v. Linda
Wachner, 123 F. Supp. 2d 731 (2000).
announcements involving brands with higher adver-
tising investments. Our findings also suggest that
investors react more favorably to announcements
involving larger licensor firms; however, investors’
reactions do not appear to be influenced by licensor
firms’ licensing experience.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 develops the conceptual framework and
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the method. Section 4
reports the results. Section 5 discusses implications
and limitations of the study.
2. Conceptual Framework and
Hypotheses
Investors consider newly announced public informa-
tion and assess the extent to which it foreshadows an
increase (or decrease) in a firm’s future cash flows.
Based on their assessments, investors adjust the firm’s
stock price, leading to a corresponding change in the
firm’s shareholder value (see Boyd et al. 2010, Geyskens
et al. 2002, Raassens et al. 2012). Drawing on prior
research using event studies, and research on brand
extensions and strategic alliances, we build a concep-
tual framework for analyzing implications of brand
licensing announcements for licensors’ shareholder
value (see Figure 1).
Brand licensing entails a firm authorizing the use
of its brand on a licensee’s product in exchange for
royalties on the product’s sales. The brand helps the
licensee realize higher product sales than it would
without the brand name. The higher the product sales
a brand helps a licensee realize, the higher the resulting
royalties generated for the licensor. As such, follow-
ing a brand licensing announcement, the licensor’s
investors are likely to assess the brand’s ability to stimu-
late licensee product sales (and thus generate royalties for
the licensor). Research on brand extensions suggests a
brand’s ability to stimulate sales of a licensee prod-
uct is a function of the licensed brand’s advertising
investments, fit with licensee product, and breadth
(e.g., Loken et al. 2010, pp. 15–19; Völckner and Sat-
tler 2006). This suggests that investors consider these
variables as indicators of the licensor firm’s future roy-
alties and cash flows resulting from the licensing of its
brand.2
Although brand licensing can generate royalties
for a licensor, it also introduces the threat of licensee
opportunism. For example, a licensee may use sub-
standard parts and materials and/or use unauthorized
distribution channels that can hurt the brand’s image,
2 A brand’s ability to stimulate licensee product sales is also likely to
be a function of the brand’s equity. Because of limited availability of
data on brand equity, we estimate brand equity following Simon
and Sullivan (1993) and include it as a control variable in our
model.
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Figure 1 Conceptual Framework
+
+
Brand’s ability to stimulate
licensee product sales
1. Brand advertising
    investments
2. Brand fit
3. Brand breadth
Licensor firm’s ability to
limit licensee opportunism
1. Firm size
2. Firm licensing experience (Because of lower expected brand dilution)
(Because of higher expected royalties)
Shareholder
value
i.e., lead to brand dilution. This can adversely affect
sales of other products marketed under the brand
name. Whereas some licensors may have the ability to
prevent or limit licensee opportunism and the ensuing
brand dilution, other licensors may lack this ability and
hence may be more vulnerable to licensee opportunism.
As such, following a brand licensing announcement,
investors are likely to assess the licensor firm’s ability to
limit licensee opportunism (and thus limit brand dilution
and its adverse effect on the licensor firm’s cash flows
from sales of other products marketed under the brand
name). Research on strategic alliances suggests a licen-
sor’s ability to limit licensee opportunism is a function
of its size and licensing experience (e.g., Dickson et al.
2006, Leiblein and Madsen 2009, Simonin 1997). This
suggests that investors consider these variables as
indicators of the threat of brand dilution and its effect
on the licensor firm’s future cash flows.
We next discuss the role of each of the aforemen-
tioned brand and licensor variables in influencing
investor expectations of a licensor’s future cash flows
and their effect on the licensor firm’s shareholder value
(Figure 1).
2.1. Brand’s Ability to Stimulate
Licensee Product Sales
Research on brand extensions (e.g., Broniarczyk and
Alba 1994, Völckner and Sattler 2006) suggests that
consumers use their previously formed associations
with a licensed brand to evaluate a new licensee product
as follows. Consumers retrieve their associations with
the licensed brand from their memories; to the extent
these associations are relevant for the licensee product,
consumers transfer them to the licensee product—
i.e., link them with the licensee product—and use
these associations to evaluate the licensee product
(see Ahluwalia and Gürhan-Canli 2000, Feldman and
Lynch 1988). Thus, consumers are likely to evaluate a
licensee product more favorably when the associations
with the licensed brand are (i) more accessible in their
memories (because such associations are more likely to
be retrieved from their memories) and (ii) more relevant
to the licensee product (because such associations are
more likely to be transferred to the licensee product
and influence its evaluation) (e.g., Loken et al. 2010,
p. 17; Völckner and Sattler 2006, p. 21).3
Prior research suggests that a brand’s associations are
more accessible when the brand has made greater adver-
tising investments (e.g., Naik et al. 1998, Draganska
and Klapper 2011). In addition, a brand’s associations
are more relevant when the brand is perceived to have
greater fit with a licensee product (e.g., Broniarczyk and
Alba 1994) and the brand is used on a broader array of
products, i.e., has greater brand breadth (Meyvis and
Janiszewski 2004). Thus, when a licensed brand has
higher levels of these variables, consumers are likely to
evaluate the licensee product more favorably, which is
likely to result in higher sales of the licensee product
and higher royalties for the licensor firm. This suggests
that investors use these brand variables as indicators of
the licensor firm’s future cash flows, as discussed next.
2.1.1. Brand Advertising Investments. Brand
advertising investments refer to the amount of money
spent on advertising a brand over an extended time
period prior to a brand licensing announcement. Higher
brand advertising investments lead to greater brand
awareness (e.g., Naik et al. 1998, Draganska and
Klapper 2011). Thus, when a more heavily advertised
brand is licensed, investors expect the brand’s associa-
tions to be more accessible to consumers, and therefore
more likely to lead to favorable evaluations of the
licensee product (see Broniarczyk and Alba 1994, Lane
and Jacobson 1995, Loken et al. 2010). As such, investors
are likely to expect higher sales of the licensee product,
3 The evaluation of a licensee product is also influenced by the
favorability of associations with the licensed brand. Given limited
data availability, we control for these with an estimate of brand
equity (following Simon and Sullivan 1993).
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and hence higher future cash flows from royalties for
the licensor firm. Thus, when a licensed brand has
greater advertising investments, investors are likely to
pay a higher price for the licensor firm’s stock follow-
ing a brand licensing announcement. Therefore, we
expect the following:
Hypothesis 1. The greater the brand’s advertising
investments, the higher the licensor firm’s abnormal returns
following a brand licensing announcement.
2.1.2. Brand Fit. Brand fit refers to the extent to
which a brand’s associations are applicable or relevant to
a given product (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994, Völckner
and Sattler 2006). When a brand’s fit with a licensee
product is greater (i.e., the brand’s associations are
perceived as more relevant for the licensee product),
investors expect consumers to transfer more of their
brand associations to the licensee product, leading to
more favorable evaluations of the licensee product
(Broniarczyk and Alba 1994, Park et al. 1991). As
such, investors are likely to expect higher sales of
the licensee product, and hence higher future cash
flows from royalties for the licensor firm. For example,
when Bally Total Fitness licensed its Bally brand for
women’s sportswear, it is likely that investors expected
consumers to readily transfer the brand’s associations
of “wellness,” “high quality,” and “exercise and fitness
products” to the women’s sportswear products, leading
to more favorable licensee product evaluations, higher
licensee product sales, and higher cash flows from
royalties for Bally Total Fitness. Thus, when brand fit
is greater, investors are likely to pay a higher price for
the licensor firm’s stock following a brand licensing
announcement. Therefore, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 2. The greater the brand’s fit with the
licensee product, the higher the licensor firm’s abnormal
returns following a brand licensing announcement.
2.1.3. Brand Breadth. Brand breadth refers to the
number of distinct product categories that carry the
brand name (Boush and Loken 1991). A broader brand
tends to be more strongly associated with the benefits
it provides than with the specific products on which
it is used. This is because the brand’s presence in a
larger set of product categories makes the brand’s
product-specific associations more diffused (see Meyvis
and Janiszewski 2004). In addition, a brand’s benefit
associations are more abstract than its product asso-
ciations, and hence relevant to a greater variety of
licensee products (see Batra et al. 2010, Boush and
Loken 1991). For example, a broad brand like Liz
Clairborne is associated more strongly with its abstract
benefits (“trendy,” “fashionable,” and “quality”) than
with the large number of concrete products it sells (e.g.,
beddings, cosmetics, furniture, paint, apparel, rugs,
and tiles). As such, the Liz Clairborne brand arguably is
relevant for diverse licensee products such as cookware
and home storage containers. In contrast, a narrow
brand such as Charmin is associated more strongly
with its few, concrete products (e.g., toilet paper) than
with its abstract benefits (“softness”). As such, the
Charmin brand may be argued to be of relevance to a
smaller set of licensee products, and of questionable
relevance even for products offering the “softness”
benefit (e.g., skin cream and apparel).
The preceding discussion suggests that when a
broader brand is licensed, investors are likely to expect
its associations to be relevant for a greater variety of
licensee products and hence more likely to be trans-
ferred by consumers to the licensee product and influ-
ence their evaluations. As such, investors are likely to
expect higher sales of the licensee product, and hence
higher future cash flows from royalties for the licensor
firm. Thus, when brand breadth is greater, investors are
likely to pay a higher price for the licensor firm’s stock
following a brand licensing announcement. Therefore,
we expect the following:
Hypothesis 3. The greater the brand breadth, the higher
the licensor firm’s abnormal returns following a brand
licensing announcement.
2.2. Licensor Firm’s Ability to Limit
Licensee Opportunism
Pursuant to a licensing agreement, a licensor cedes
control over the manufacturing and marketing of a
product with the brand name to a licensee. The licensee
can act opportunistically by selling its product through
unauthorized distribution channels and pricing or
promoting it in a way that is beneficial to the licensee
but hurts the brand’s image (e.g., Agins and Quick
2001). If not prevented by the licensor, such licensee
opportunism can dilute the licensor’s brand and hurt
sales of other products marketed under the brand
name (see Loken and John 1993, Swaminathan et al.
2001). Thus, if a licensor lacks the ability to monitor
and control a licensee’s behavior, a brand licensing
agreement can reduce the licensor firm’s future cash
flows. Therefore, we expect investors evaluating a
licensing announcement to assess the licensor’s ability
to limit licensee opportunism. Prior research on strate-
gic alliances suggests that a licensor firm’s ability to
limit licensee opportunism is likely to be related to
its size and prior licensing experience (e.g., Leiblein
and Madsen 2009, Simonin 1997). This suggests that
investors consider these variables as indicators of the
licensor’s future cash flows, as discussed next.
2.2.1. Firm Size. Research on strategic alliances
by Leiblein and Madsen (2009, pp. 719–720) suggests
investors use licensor firm’s size as a key signal of a
licensor’s ability to limit licensee opportunism (see also
Buckley 1997, Dickson et al. 2006). Specifically, investors
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are likely to view a larger licensor firm as having
greater resources such as dedicated expert personnel
who can limit licensee opportunism by (i) thoroughly
vetting a prospective licensee prior to entering into
a licensing agreement with it, (ii) incorporating com-
prehensive legal safeguards in its contract with the
licensee, (iii) monitoring the licensee’s conduct, and
(iv) taking corrective actions in case of contractual
violations that can lead to brand dilution. (For a discus-
sion of financial resources needed to monitor partner
conduct, see Stump and Heide (1996) and Wathne and
Heide (2000).) Therefore, investors are likely to view a
larger licensor firm as better equipped to limit licensee
opportunism that can dilute the licensed brand.
As such, when a brand licensing announcement
involves a larger licensor firm, investors are likely to
see a smaller threat of licensee opportunism and hence
a smaller threat of brand dilution and reduction in
future cash flows. This is likely to lead investors to
pay higher prices for a larger (versus smaller) licensor
firm’s stock following a brand licensing announcement.
Therefore, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 4. The larger the licensor firm’s size, the
higher the abnormal returns following a brand licensing
announcement.
2.2.2. Firm Licensing Experience. Research on
strategic alliances (e.g., Kale and Singh 2007, Simonin
1997) also suggests that investors expect a more experi-
enced licensor to have better know-how for selecting
licensees and drafting contracts so as to minimize
licensee opportunism (e.g., writing contracts that restrict
sales of licensee products to channels that are consistent
with the brand’s image). In addition, investors are
likely to expect experienced licensors to be more skilled
at monitoring licensees and ensuring that the licensees
manufacture and market their products in accord with
agreed-upon standards. Thus, this stream of research
suggests that investors view a licensor firm’s prior
licensing experience—number of licensing agreements
entered into by the licensor firm during a time period
preceding the focal announcement—as a signal of its
ability to limit licensee opportunism.
As such, when a brand licensing announcement
involves a more experienced licensor firm, investors
are likely to believe there is a smaller threat of licensee
opportunism and hence a smaller threat of brand
dilution and reduction in future cash flows. This is
likely to lead investors to pay a higher price for a more
(versus less) experienced licensor firm’s stock following
a brand licensing announcement. Therefore, we expect
the following:
Hypothesis 5. The greater the licensor firm’s licensing
experience, the higher the abnormal returns following a
brand licensing announcement.
3. Method
3.1. Event Study Approach
To study the effect of brand licensing on a licensor
firm’s shareholder value, we identify brand licensing
announcements and measure investors’ responses using
the event study method. The method relies on the
efficient market hypothesis according to which the
stock price of a firm reflects the impact of all publicly
available information about a firm on its future cash
flows (MacKinlay 1997). Thus, when new information
that may affect a firm’s future cash flows is made
public (i.e., an event occurs), investors update their
expectations of the firm’s future cash flows and adjust
the price they are willing to pay for the firm’s stock.
The resulting change in stock price captures the net
present value of the expected change in future earnings
of the firm. This approach is widely used to assess
the financial impact of marketing actions such as
appointments of chief marketing officers (Boyd et al.
2010), formation of marketing alliances (Swaminathan
and Moorman 2009), and Internet channel additions
(Geyskens et al. 2002).
We assess the effect of a brand licensing announce-
ment (the “event”) on the stock price of the licensor
firm by estimating the change in stock price adjusted
for firm and market factors during a specified time
window around the event date. First, we forecast the
expected return during the event window based on
the history of the licensor firm’s stock returns and the
stock market’s returns. Then, we identify the difference
between the expected and the actual stock return of the
licensor firm as the risk-adjusted abnormal stock return
using the Carhart (1997) model (see Srinivasan and
Hanssens 2009).
To calculate the expected stock return, we regress the
licensor firm’s actual daily stock returns on the returns
of an equally weighted market portfolio, the Fama and
French (1993) size portfolio, book-to-market portfolio,
and the Carhart (1997) momentum portfolio starting
130 days before the brand licensing announcement and
ending 30 days before the announcement. We then use
estimates of the parameters (i.e., ij , ij , sij , hij , uij ) thus
obtained to calculate the expected stock return on the
event date as well as on each of the five days before
and after the event date:
E4Rijt5=
(
ij +ij RMt +sij SMBt +hij HMLt
+uijUMDt
)
3 (1)
E4Rijt5= expected stock return on day t of firm i that
licenses its brand j
RMt = returns from an equally weighted portfolio of
the total stock market on day t
SMBt = Fama and French (1993) size portfolio return
on day t
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HMLt = Fama and French (1993) book-to-market ratio
portfolio return on day t
UMDt = Carhart (1997) momentum portfolio return on
day t
ij1ij1 sij1hij1uij = parameters estimated over a 100-
day period ending 30 days before the event
date
The risk-adjusted abnormal return (ARijt) on day t of
firm i licensing its brand j , therefore, is the difference
between firm’s actual stock return (Rijt) and its expected
return (E4Rijt5):
ARijt =Rijt −E4Rijt50 (2)
According to Fama (1970), ARijt provides an unbiased
estimate of the expected change in the licensor firm’s
future cash flows. In addition to the daily abnormal
returns, some studies also compute the cumulative
abnormal return that are obtained by aggregating the
firm’s daily abnormal stock returns over an event
window (t11 t2) around a licensing announcement date.
McWilliams and Siegel (1997), however, recommend
setting the event window (t11 t2) to the date of the
event if it is unanticipated, and this recommendation is
commonly adopted in prior research (e.g., Chaney et al.
1991, Boyd et al. 2010). We follow this recommendation
and analyze firm abnormal return on the event date,
i.e., the date of the licensing announcement (hereafter
denoted by t). However, in addition to ARijt , we also
check for cumulative abnormal returns using wider
event windows as discussed in the Results section.
3.2. Hypotheses Testing
3.2.1. Outcome Equation. We test our hypotheses
by estimating an outcome equation (Equation (3)) in
which the abnormal return (ARijt) of firm i following
the licensing of its brand j announced on day t is
a function of the information investors have about
the brand and the licensor firm. In addition to the
five hypothesized independent variables, several other
variables arguably influence investors’ evaluations
of a brand licensing announcement. Therefore, the
outcome equation (Equation (3)) includes a number
of control variables that may cue investors to (i) the
extent to which a licensee product will be accepted
by consumers, (ii) the extent to which a licensor firm
will be able to limit licensee opportunism, (iii) the
favorability of licensing terms for the licensor firm,
and (iv) the market potential for licensee product sales.
Each of these control variables is described next.
We control for Product Fit—the extent to which
a brand’s prototypical product fits with a licensee
product—because greater product fit is likely to lead to
greater consumer acceptance of the licensee product
(Park et al. 1991). In addition, we control for whether a
brand is a Corporate Brand or Not. A licensee product
may be accepted by consumers to a greater extent if
sold under a corporate brand name; this is because
a product with a corporate brand name can inherit
not only the brand’s product-specific attributes, but
also its corporate attributes such as a rich heritage,
values, and citizenship programs (Aaker 2004, p. 7).
We also include Estimated Brand Equity as a control
variable because higher brand equity is indicative of
more favorable consumer evaluations of a brand, which
can lead to greater consumer acceptance of a licensee
product sold under the brand name.
We control for Prior Brand Licensing Categories—
the number of product categories in which a brand
has previously been licensed. Licensing a brand in a
large number of product categories, each with distinct
manufacturing, operations, and distribution channels,
increases the complexity of monitoring the varied
licensing activities and makes it more difficult for
the licensor firm to limit licensee opportunism. Firms
making Licensing Revenue Disclosures—disclosing brand
licensing as a significant source of revenues—are more
likely to have well-established systems and processes
for limiting licensee opportunism. As such, this variable
is included as a control variable. In addition, we include
Firm Earnings as a control variable because firms with
higher earnings tend to have greater financial resources
for monitoring licensees and limiting opportunism.
We control for Licensee Licensing Experience because
more experienced licensees are likely to be more adept
at negotiating lower royalty rates, thus lowering abnor-
mal returns for licensor firms. We also control for
whether a brand is licensed to a Publicly Listed Licensee
(versus a privately held one). Actions of publicly held
companies are under greater shareholder scrutiny, and
as such, public companies may negotiate harder to
obtain lower royalty rates. Furthermore, we control for
whether a brand is licensed to a Foreign-Based Licensee
(versus a domestic one) because the use of a foreign-
based licensee may suggest that the licensing firm is
expanding to new markets with greater growth and
royalty generating potential. Finally, we include Indus-
try Dummy Variables to control for industry-specific
factors that may influence abnormal returns.
3.2.2. Selection Equation. Variables related to a
brand and the firm that owns it are likely to influence
whether or not the brand is licensed in the first place.
Therefore, estimating the outcome equation using
ordinary least squares may result in biased estimates
(see Greene 2008). To safeguard against this, we jointly
estimate the outcome equation (Equation (3)) with a
selection equation (Equation (4)). The selection equation
incorporates brand and firm variables as predictors of
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the likelihood of brand licensing, i.e., whether a brand
is included in a brand licensing announcement or not.4
A number of brand variables included in the outcome
equation arguably affect not just the abnormal returns
following brand licensing announcements, but also
firms’ (brand owners’) interest in licensing their brands
and potential licensees’ willingness to pay royalties
for such brands, thus influencing the likelihood of
the brands being licensed. We therefore include these
variables in the selection equation. Specifically, greater
Brand Advertising Investments, greater Brand Breadth,
whether the brand is a Corporate Brand or Not, and
higher Estimated Brand Equity are likely to increase
the probability of a brand being licensed. This is
because a brand with these characteristics is likely
to generate higher licensee product sales and hence
higher royalties for the brand owner, thus making
licensing agreements attractive both for the brand
owner and potential licensees. Some brand variables
included in the outcome equation, however, cannot be
conceptualized/measured in the absence of a licensing
agreement identifying the licensee and its product (as is
the case with Brand Fit and Product Fit), or are limited
in their ability to predict attractiveness of licensing
for brand owners or potential licensees (as is the case
with Prior Brand Licensing Categories). As such, these
variables are not included in the selection equation.
Similarly, a number of firm (brand owner) variables
included in the outcome equation are also likely to
predict whether a brand is licensed or not, and hence
are included in the selection equation. Specifically,
Firm Size and Firm Earnings reflect a firm’s resources
and its financial standing, respectively. Firms with
higher levels of these variables are less dependent on
royalties from licensing and hence are less likely to
enter into licensing agreements. Similarly, Firm Licensing
Experience included in the outcome equation reflects a
firm’s licensing-related knowledge. Firms that have
licensed a brand a least once are likely to have more
licensing-related knowledge than those that have not
previously licensed a brand, and hence are more likely
to enter into licensing agreements. As such, we include
Whether Firm Previously Licensed a Brand in the selection
equation. The selection equation does not include Firm
Licensing Revenue Disclosure because it is unrelated to
the attractiveness of licensing for a firm or for potential
licensees.
In addition, the selection equation does not include
licensee variables (Licensee Licensing Experience, Publicly
Listed Licensee, and Foreign-Based Licensee) that are
in the outcome equation because a licensee can be
identified only after a firm licenses its brand. Industry
4 We use the term “firms” to describe both companies that licensed
their brands, i.e., licensors, as well as companies that owned brands
but did not license them.
Dummy Variables included in the outcome equation to
control for industry-specific differences are excluded
from the selection equation because, as described
subsequently, the selection equation compares brands
that were licensed to competitors’ brands that were
not licensed, thus controlling for industry-specific
differences. Finally, the selection equation includes two
additional variables (Firm Leverage and Firm Liquidity)
that are not in the outcome equation; these variables
are likely to influence whether a brand is licensed or
not, but not influence the abnormal returns following
brand licensing announcements. Specifically, a firm
with higher leverage and lower liquidity is likely to
find brand licensing to be more attractive because the
resulting incremental cash flows are likely to lower its
leverage and increase its liquidity. There is little reason,
however, to expect these two variables to influence a
licensee product’s sales or opportunism.
The selection equation involves analyzing the brands
featured in the licensing announcements used to esti-
mate the outcome equation and competing firms’
brands that were not featured in licensing announce-
ments in the same year:
ARijt = 0 +1 ADIijt +2 FITijt +3 BREADTHijt
+4 SIZEijt +5 EXPijt +6 PFITijt +7 CORPijt
+8 BEQijt +9 PBLCijt +10 LRDijt +11 EARijt
+12 LLEijt +13 LPLijt +14 LFBijt
+
18∑
l=15
l INDijt +ijt1 (3)
LICijT = 0 + 1 ADIijT +2 BREADTHijT +3 SIZEijT
+ 4 LEXPijT +5 CORPijT +6 BEQijT
+ 7 EARijT +8 LEV ijT +9 LIQijT +ijT 3 (4)
ARijt = abnormal return of firm i, owner of brand j ,
on its licensing announcement day t
LICijT = brand licensing announcement or not (whether
an announcement about firm i licensing its
brand j was made in year T )
Hypothesized Variables
ADI = Brand Advertising Investments
FIT = Brand Fit
BREADTH = Brand Breadth
SIZE = Firm Size
EXP = Firm Licensing Experience
Control Variables
PFIT = Product Fit
CORP = Corporate Brand or Not
BEQ = Estimated Brand Equity
PBLC = Prior Brand Licensing Categories
LRD = Firm Licensing Revenue Disclosure
EAR = Firm Earnings
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LLE = Licensee Licensing Experience
LPL = Publicly Listed Licensee
LFB = Foreign-Based Licensee
IND = Industry Dummy Variables
LEXP = Whether Firm Previously Licensed a Brand
LEV = Firm Leverage
LIQ = Firm Liquidity;
ijt ∼N40115, ijT ∼N40115, and = corr4ijtijT 5.
Following Greene (2005) and Kennedy (2003), we
estimate the outcome and selection equations simulta-
neously using maximum likelihood estimation (see also
Cameron and Trivedi 2010, pp. 558–562). In addition,
we allow error terms within a cluster (i.e., firm) to be
correlated with each other to account for multiple brand
licensing announcements by a firm. This minimizes the
threat of “misleading” standard errors (Wooldridge
2010, p. 865). We mean center all continuous variables
to enable the interpretation of a variable’s coefficient at
the mean values of other variables in the equations.
3.3. Data for Outcome Equation Variables and
Their Measures
Brand licensing announcements for estimation of the
outcome equation were identified by searching multiple
publications using Factiva. We considered all brand
licensing agreements announced between 1999 and
2006, and included 412 announcements of publicly
listed brand owners, each licensing a single brand
to a single licensee. Of these, we retained 337 licens-
ing announcements that were not in close proximity
(±2 days) to other events such as earnings announce-
ments that could impact stock returns (see McWilliams
and Siegel 1997, Boyd et al. 2010). From among these,
we retained 171 announcements for which we could
(i) verify the accuracy of the release date with other
sources (firm website and other search engines, such
as LexisNexis), (ii) obtain advertising investment data
from Kantar Media’s AdSpender database and brand
breadth data from the USPTO, and (iii) obtain stock
returns and accounting data from Compustat and the
University of Chicago’s CRSP. Our sample of 171 brand
licensing agreements announced between 1999 and
2006 includes 51 unique licensor firms and 74 unique
licensed brands. Descriptive statistics of the sample are
provided in Appendices A and B.
The outcome equation models a licensor’s abnor-
mal return following a brand licensing announcement
as a function of several variables as of the day of
the announcement. As such, all variables in the out-
come equation were measured as of the licensing
announcement day or last day of the month prior to
the announcement; when these data were not available,
variables were measured as of the year of the licensing
announcement.
Stock Returns. We use the CRSP database to obtain
daily stock returns from an equally weighted market
index (comprising all stocks on the NASDAQ, AMEX,
and NYSE). Data for the risk-free rate of return (Fama
and French 1993) and the momentum factors (Carhart
1997) were obtained from Kenneth French’s website.5
Brand Advertising Investments. We used Kantar
Media’s AdSpender database to obtain a firm’s total
advertising spending for a brand. We measure a brand’s
advertising investments as the sum of monthly advertis-
ing spending over a five year period immediately prior
to the month of the licensing announcement. We take
the natural logarithm of this number to lower the
influence of extreme values (see Anderson et al. 1997).
Brand Fit. We measured brand fit by first retriev-
ing all brands’ associations and then assessing their
relevance for their respective licensee products with
the help of independent judges. To obtain an accu-
rate measure of brand fit, we started by assessing
the brands’ associations as of the year of their licens-
ing announcements. We retrieved brand descriptions
from the brand owners’ annual reports to shareholders
released in the year of the licensing announcements
(we decided against conducting consumer surveys
because they likely would have retrieved the brands’
current associations). The use of firms’ annual reports
was guided by several considerations. First, firms are
knowledgeable about consumers’ understanding and
perceptions of brands, in part because they under-
take formal and informal assessments of their brands
(e.g., market research studies). Second, firms gener-
ally provide accurate information in annual reports
because they are under constant scrutiny from stock
analysts and shareholders, and face potentially severe
consequences if errors are discovered (Bettman and
Weitz 1983, Yadav et al. 2007). Third, annual reports
are available for multiple firms over several time peri-
ods (Eggers and Kaplan 2009). Annual reports have
been widely used in prior research on firms’ strategic
orientations (Noble et al. 2002), strategic and cultural
changes (Lee and Grewal 2004), and chief executive
officer behavior (Yadav et al. 2007).
Following the historical approach to data collection
(e.g., Golder 2000, Lee and Grewal 2004), two judges
first independently surveyed firms’ annual reports for
the years in which they announced brand licensing
agreements, and then compared notes and reached
agreement. The judges identified attributes, benefits,
and product-related descriptions for all licensed brands
in our database (see Keller 1993).
To ensure the validity of brand descriptions from
annual reports, we also surveyed another company
source (company press releases) and an independent
data source (newspaper and magazine articles) during
the year of the licensing announcement following the
5 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html.
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same steps. Two new teams comprised of two judges
each independently accessed these sources through
Factiva; collected data on attributes, benefits, and
product-related descriptions of brands in the years of
the brand licensing announcements; and then compared
notes and reached agreement. We were able to retrieve
brand descriptions using company press releases for
all but four brands in our data set; brand descriptions
from trade press articles were found for 51% of the
announcements. Brand descriptions obtained from
annual reports were then compared with descriptions
retrieved from company press releases and trade press
articles. Approximately 80% of the brand descriptions
retrieved from annual reports were also found in
company press releases; similarly, 61% of the brand
descriptions mentioned in annual reports were also
found in newspaper and magazine article, indicating
convergent validity.
Next, we assessed the relevance of brand descrip-
tions for their respective licensee products. Two new
judges were independently provided brand descriptions
obtained from annual reports and asked to indicate
the extent to which a brand’s description was relevant
for a given licensee product on a three-point scale
(1 = little or no relevance, 2 = moderate relevance, and
3 = high relevance). To eliminate possible confounding
by judges’ current brand associations, the judges were
not presented with actual brand names; rather, brands
were described in terms of their associations (descrip-
tions) only. The judges’ responses have a proportional
reduction in loss reliability of 0.81, which is well above
the 0.70 cutoff recommended by Rust and Cooil (1994).
As such, an index of the two judges’ ratings was used
in the analysis (see Appendix C for specific examples).
Finally, we take the natural logarithm of this score to
lower the influence of extreme values.
Brand Breadth. We retrieved the number of product
categories in which a brand was present as of the
day of the licensing announcement using trademark
applications filed with the USPTO database. Trademark
applications list specific product categories actively
associated in commerce with a brand and capture a
brand’s product variety for a range of brands across
time and over a wide range of industries (see Gao and
Hitt 2012). We counted a brand’s number of unique
product categories (per the USPTO’s international
class classification) listed as active as of the day of the
announcement and took the natural logarithm of this
number to measure brand breadth.
Firm Size. Following prior research, we use the
natural log of the total sales of the firm reported in
its annual report covering the announcement day as
a measure of its size (see Shankar 2006, Srinivasan
et al. 2007). The size of the firm, as reflected by the
firm’s sales revenues, has been hypothesized to impact
a firm’s marketing actions (see, for example, Gatignon
et al. 1989). This metric was obtained from Compustat.
Firm Licensing Experience. We measure firm licensing
experience as the number of brand licensing agreements
announced by the firm during the five years immedi-
ately prior to the day of the licensing announcement.
The data were hand collected using the electronic search
engine Factiva that searches prominent newspapers and
trade publications for brand licensing announcements
related to the firm. To lower the effect of extreme
values, this variable was log transformed.
Control Variables. With the exception of Product Fit,
all control variables and their measures and sources
are described in Table 1 to conserve space.6 Product Fit
refers to the fit between a brand’s products and the
licensee product. Because most brands are present in
multiple product categories, we first identified each
brand’s product prototype as of the day of the licensing
announcement, which was then used to measure the
fit with the licensee product. A product prototype
represents “a kind of average or central tendency”
of the category members (Mao and Krishnan 2006,
p. 42; see also Loken et al. 2007). Two judges were pre-
sented with each brand’s product categories obtained
from the USPTO database (without mentioning the
brand name). The judges independently reviewed each
brand’s product categories and provided an average,
or central tendency (i.e., product prototype), then met
and reached agreement.
A second team of two judges then assessed the
fit between the brand’s product prototype and the
licensee product, again without mentioning the brand
name. The judges responded to five questions about the
similarity of the licensee product to the brand’s product
prototype with respect to (1) needs the products satisfy,
(2) situations in which they are used, (3) skills required
to manufacture them, (4) skills required to sell them,
and (5) their physical features (see Aaker and Keller
1990). They rated the similarity on a three-point scale
(1 = little or no similarity, 2 = moderate similarity, and
3 = high similarity). An index of the five ratings was
used in the analysis as a measure of product fit (see
Appendix C for examples of this procedure).
3.4. Data for Selection Equation Variables and
Their Measures
Data for the outcome equation comprised 171 obser-
vations of brand licensing announcements made by
51 licensor firms between 1999 and 2006. The selection
equation involves analyzing the brands (in these 171
announcements) that were licensed and competing
firms’ brands that were not licensed in the same year.
6 We thank two anonymous reviewers for suggesting key control
variables.
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Table 1 Other Variables, Measures, and Data Sources
Variable Measure Data source
Corporate Brand or Not Equals 1 if the brand being licensed is a corporate brand and 0 otherwise 10-K filings
Estimated Brand Equity Brand equity is estimated as follows. First, we use the Simon and Sullivan (1993) method to
calculate a ratio of firm-level brand equity (attributable to all the brands of a firm) scaled by
firm’s tangible assets. Second, we multiply this ratio by the tangible assets of the firm to
obtain a dollar value for the firm-level brand equity and log transform the variable. Third, we
estimate brand equity of a brand by multiplying the firm-level brand equity by the ratio of the
brand’s advertising spending to firm’s total advertising spending. To avoid multicollinearity
due to the correlation between brand advertising investments and estimated brand equity of
the brand, we regress it on brand advertising investments and use the residuals as the control
variable in the outcome and selection equations (see Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001).
USPTO, AdSpender,
Corporate affiliations,
LexisNexis, Compustat,
SEC filings
Prior Brand Licensing
Categories
Number of brand’s product categories (defined by USPTO’s International Class classification) for
which licensee products were publicly announced during the five years preceding the
licensing announcement; the variable is log transformed
Factiva, USPTO
Firm Licensing Revenue
Disclosure
Equals 1 if the firm identifies brand licensing as a significant source of revenues in its annual
reports and 0 otherwise
10-K filings
Firm Earnings Annual operating income before depreciation of the firm (Compustat data item OIBDP) scaled by
total assets (Compustat data item AT)
Compustat
Licensee Licensing
Experience
Number of public announcements involving the licensee acquiring brand licenses during the
five years preceding the day of the licensing announcement; the variable is log transformed
Factiva
Publicly Listed Licensee Equals 1 if the licensee if a publicly listed firm and 0 otherwise Compustat, CRSP
Foreign-Based Licensee Equals 1 if the licensee is a firm based in the United States and 0 otherwise Factiva, licensee website
Industry Dummy Variables Industry dummy variables corresponding to the five major industries in our sample: (1) apparel,
footwear and jewelry (SIC two-digit codes 23, 31, 51, 59); (2) printing, chemicals, and rubber
(SIC two-digit codes 27, 28, 30, 38); (3) communications, transportation, and entertainment
(SIC two-digit codes 35, 36, 37, 48, 70, 79); (4) games, sports, and retail furniture (SIC
two-digit codes 25, 39, 58); (5) business services (SIC two-digit codes 67, 72)
Compustat
Whether Firm Previously
Licensed a Brand
Equals 1 if the firm had licensed a brand in the previous five years and 0 otherwise Factiva
Firm Leverage Total long-term debt of the firm (Compustat data item DLTT) scaled by the market capitalization
of the firm, which is the product of the stock price at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat
data item PRCC_F) and the total number of outstanding shares (Compustat data item CSHO)
Compustat
Firm Liquidity Ratio of the current assets (Compustat data item ACT) to the current liabilities (Compustat data
item LCT) of the firm
Compustat
Notes. Variables in the outcome equation were measured as of the licensing announcement day or the end of the month prior to the month of the announcement.
When these data were not available, they were measured as of the year of the licensing announcement. Variables in the selection equation were measured as of the
year of the licensing announcement. (Whether Firm Previously Licensed a Brand, however, was identified as of the year prior such that the 171 announcements
pertaining to the outcome equation would not contribute to the firms’ licensing experience.)
We identify competing firms’ brands by first looking
up the primary four-digit Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) codes for each of the 51 licensor firms.
Next, we identified their competitors, i.e., all publicly
listed firms in the primary four-digit SIC code of each
licensor firm for each year T in which it licensed a
brand. This yielded a total of 1,550 firms (including the
51 licensor firms in the data set comprised of variables
in the outcome equation) across 33 four-digit SIC codes.
Restricting firms to the same SIC code enables us to
control for the effects of industry-specific factors likely
to influence the decision to license a brand. Following
this, we manually searched each of the competitors’
annual reports to identify brands owned by them
in each of the years the competitors were publicly
listed. This led to the identification of 4,593 brands,
which, together with the 74 licensed brands included
in the data set comprised of variables in the outcome
equation, yielded a total of 4,667 unique brands for
potential inclusion in the data set for variables in the
selection equation.
We used Kantar Media’s AdSpender to manually
collect data on brand advertising spending for each of
these brands for five years ending the year in which
the brand or a competitor’s brand was licensed (for
measuring Brand Advertising Investments). We were able
to obtain advertising spending data for 1,138 brands
owned by 390 firms. We then collected data from the
USPTO to compute Brand Breadth for each brand at the
end of each year. We were able to obtain trademark
filings at the USPTO for 1,021 brands. These data
collection efforts yielded 1,806 observations (pertaining
to 1,021 brands owned by 372 firms during 1999–2006).
However, data for several variables in the selection
equation (Firm Earnings, Firm Size, Firm Liquidity, Firm
Leverage, Estimated Brand Equity) were only available
for 1,570 observations comprising 858 brands owned
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Table 2 Abnormal Returns for Brand Licensing Announcements
Number of Percentage of
Average announcements with announcements with
Day N AR (%) positive (negative) AR positive (negative) AR (%) CsectErr (T ) p-value Rank test (Z) p-value Jackknife (Z) p-value
−5 171 −0004 88 (83) 51 (49) −0020 0042 0007 0047 −0052 0030
−4 171 −0009 82 (89) 48 (52) −0039 0035 −1028 0010 −0079 0021
−3 171 −0004 84 (87) 49 (51) −0017 0043 −0004 0048 −0038 0035
−2 171 0000 90 (81) 53 (47) −0001 0050 0070 0024 0023 0041
−1 171 0012 85 (86) 50 (50) 0070 0024 0065 0026 0032 0037
0 171 0033 96 (75) 56 (44) 2069 0000 2078 0000 2074 0000
1 171 0014 91 (80) 53 (47) 0090 0018 1034 0009 1085 0003
2 171 0021 88 (83) 51 (49) 0098 0016 0056 0029 0029 0039
3 171 0011 92 (79) 54 (46) 0067 0025 0052 0030 0021 0042
4 171 0014 86 (85) 50 (50) 0078 0022 0046 0033 0082 0021
5 171 0013 91 (80) 53 (47) 0079 0021 0096 0017 0092 0018
Notes. N, number of observations pertaining to the outcome equation; AR, abnormal returns; CsectErr (T ), cross-sectional error T -statistic.
by 310 firms. These 1,570 observations were used for
model estimation.
Selection equation variables common to the outcome
equation, as well as additional variables (such as Firm
Leverage and Firm Liquidity) were measured as of each
year included in the sample. Whether Firm Previously
Licensed a Brand, was identified as of the year prior
such that the 171 announcements pertaining to the
outcome equation would not contribute to the firms’
licensing experience. Measures and data sources for
these additional variables are described in Table 1.
4. Results
We first report the average of the abnormal returns for
the 171 brand licensing announcements, on the day of
the announcement and on each of the five days before
and after the licensing announcement. In addition, we
use three statistics to test for their statistical signifi-
cance (see Table 2). First, we use the cross-sectional
standard deviation T statistic that standardizes the
abnormal returns by using the standard deviation of
the estimation period of abnormal returns (Brown and
Warner 1985). Second, we use a nonparametric rank
test (Corrado 1989). Third, we use the jackknife test that
assesses the robustness of conclusions to the exclusion
of each observation (Giaccotto and Sfiridis 1996). Across
all three tests, we find that average abnormal returns
on the days preceding and following the announcement
day are not statistically significant. This is consistent
with the argument that stock markets are efficient
and incorporate new information almost immediately
(Kothari and Warner 2007). Importantly, we find that
the abnormal returns calculated on the announcement
day reach highest significance level compared to cumu-
lative abnormal returns over other event windows.
In addition, we computed average abnormal returns
using wider windows such as (−21+2), (−31+3), and
found these were not statistically significant.
We find that, on average, brand licensing announce-
ments generate significant positive abnormal returns
(0.33%, p < 00001) for licensor firms on the day of the
announcements. However, there is substantial variance
in the abnormal returns, as nearly 44% of the brand
licensing announcements in our sample resulted in neg-
ative abnormal returns. This wide variation in investor
reactions underscores the importance of identifying
factors that lead to high (low) abnormal returns.
4.1. Results of Hypotheses Tests
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables
in the outcome and the selection equations. Table 4
provides results of the simultaneous estimation of
the outcome and selection equations using maximum
likelihood estimation. We outline both the results of a
simple model that includes only the control variables
(in column 1, Table 4) and the full model containing the
hypothesized variables (in column 2, Table 4). As shown
in Table 4, inclusion of the hypothesized variables
results in a significant increase in the model fit, and thus
provides evidence for the relevance of the hypothesized
variables (2455= 26023, p < 0001).7 We therefore discuss
results from estimating the full model.
Contrary to expectations, we find a negative relation-
ship between a licensed brand’s advertising investments
and its abnormal returns (1 = −00418, p < 0001). Thus,
Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Results provide strong
support for Hypothesis 2, the expectation that brand
licensing agreements involving greater brand fit with
licensee products are associated with higher abnormal
returns (2 = 00791, p < 0005). Similarly, Hypothesis 3
is also supported, as we find that abnormal returns
from brand licensing announcements are higher for
broader brands (3 = 00378, p < 0005). Hypothesis 4 is
also supported, as we find larger firms have higher
abnormal returns (4 = 00195, p < 0005). However,
7 The Shapiro–Wilk W test (Shapiro and Wilk 1965) fails to reject
the null hypothesis that errors are normally distributed (W = 00990,
p > z= 00259). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting
this test.
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Table 4 Factors Predicting Abnormal Returns
M1: Controls M2: Full
variables only model model
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Outcome equation
Brand Advertising Investments −00418 4000955∗∗∗
Brand Fit 00791 4003895∗∗
Brand Breadth 00378 4001805∗∗
Firm Size 00195 4000865∗∗
Firm Licensing Experience −00042 4000615
Product Fit −00282 4002745 −00248 4002735
Corporate Brand or Not −00427 4004385 −00425 4003435
Estimated Brand Equity 00369 4001685∗∗ 00238 4002015
Prior Brand Licensing −00048 4000705 −00018 4000635
Categories
Firm Licensing Revenue −00141 4005565 −00324 4005255
Disclosure
Firm Earnings −00527 4007795 −10393 4009155∗
Licensee Licensing −00057 4000285∗∗ −00039 4000315∗
Experience
Publicly Listed Licensee −00292 4002785 −00568 4002755∗∗
Foreign-Based Licensee 00400 4003125∗ 00491 4002745∗∗
Industry Dummy 1 −10029 4005645∗∗ −10250 4004715∗∗∗
Industry Dummy 2 −00967 4007985 −00979 4006735∗
Industry Dummy 3 −00926 4008135 −10094 4006745∗
Industry Dummy 4 −10046 4006635∗ −10110 4005355∗∗
Constant 10558 4008515∗∗ 20205 4007105∗∗∗
Selection equation
Brand Advertising Investments 00149 4000485∗∗∗ 00145 4000445∗∗∗
Brand Breadth 00344 4001515∗∗ 00355 4001415∗∗∗
Firm Size −00171 4000845∗∗ −00172 4000845∗∗
Whether Firm Previously 20127 4003735∗∗∗ 20129 4003735∗∗∗
Licensed a Brand
Corporate Brand or Not 00799 4003145∗∗∗ 00796 4003155∗∗∗
Estimated Brand Equity 00301 4001935∗ 00297 4001855∗
Firm Earnings 10510 4008525∗∗ 10531 4008465∗∗
Firm Leverage 00193 4001865 00175 4001865
Firm Liquidity −00155 4001025∗ −00157 4001005∗
Constant −30476 4003665∗∗∗ −30476 4003675∗∗∗
 00069 4002715 −00172 4001705
N4n5 171 (1,570) 171 (1,570)
Wald chi-square (df) 29.78 (13)∗∗∗ 91.78 (18)∗∗∗
Notes. Coeff., coefficient; SE, standard error; N4n5, number of observations
pertaining to the outcome (selection) equation; Industry Dummy 1, apparel,
footwear, and jewelry; Industry Dummy 2, printing, chemicals, and rubber;
Industry Dummy 3, communications, transportation, and entertainment;
Industry Dummy 4, games, sports, and retail furniture.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001 (one-tailed).
Hypothesis 5 is not supported, as we do not find a
relationship between firm licensing experience and
abnormal returns (5 = −00042, not significant).
4.2. Sensitivity Analyses
To assess the robustness of our results, we conduct
a series of sensitivity analyses. First, following prior
research (e.g., Tuli et al. 2010), we assess the impact of
removing observations with outlier residuals. Second,
we examine the robustness of our conclusions to the use
of alternative dependent variables. Although we use an
equally weighted market index to measure abnormal
returns, we also assess whether our conclusions hold
when they are measured using a value-weighted market
index. Similarly, we examine whether our results hold
when we use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model or the market model (Brown and Warner 1985),
as opposed to the Carhart (1997) model, to calculate
abnormal returns. As shown in Table 5, our conclusions
remain largely unchanged in each of these cases.
We also assess the impact of using alternative
measures of firm size—natural logarithm of total
assets, market capitalization, and number of employees.
In addition, we examine whether the results change
if we use the Simon and Sullivan (1993) measure
of brand equity that provides a firm-level estimate of
brand equity as opposed to the brand-level estimate of
brand equity. As shown in Table 5, our conclusions
remain unchanged when these alternative measures
are used. Furthermore, we examine the sensitivity
to using an alternative event window to measure
abnormal returns. Finally, we examine sensitivity to
using alternative methods of calculating standard
errors: clustering errors at the industry level (i.e., two-
digit SIC level) as opposed to the firm level; using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Wooldridge
2009, pp. 265–267); using jackknifing, a resampling
procedure that assesses the effect of removing one
observation at a time from the given sample; and using
bootstrapping with 5,000 replications. As shown in
Table 5, conclusions remain largely unchanged across
these sensitivity analyses.
5. Discussion
The present study is the first empirical investigation of
the link between brand licensing announcements and
licensors’ shareholder value. We find that although
brand licensing, on average, is associated with an
increase in a licensor’s shareholder value, as many as
44% of the agreements in our sample are followed by
negative returns for licensors. The study also identifies
likely reasons for favorable (or unfavorable) reactions
of investors. These, in turn, offer insights for managers
interested in this understudied brand strategy. In addi-
tion, our field-based study sheds light on the extent to
which several laboratory-based findings in the brand
extension literature hold in a brand licensing context
(see Loken et al. 2010).8 As discussed later, we find
that whereas certain findings about brand extensions
hold in a brand licensing context, others do not.
From a theoretical perspective, brand licensing is
similar to, but also different from, brand extensions
discussed by researchers such as Loken et al. (2010)
and Völckner and Sattler (2006). Like a brand extension,
8 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the importance
of this point.
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brand licensing seeks to take advantage of a brand’s
ability to persuade consumers to purchase a branded
product and generate higher revenues and cash flows.
A major difference between the two, however, is that
unlike brand extensions, brand licensing involves a
brand owner (the licensor) ceding control of manufac-
turing/marketing a product under its brand name to
another firm (the licensee). Opportunistic behavior by
the licensee can lead to brand dilution and hurt sales
of other products marketed under the brand name and
hurt the licensor’s cash flows. As such, when evaluating
a brand licensing announcement by a licensor firm,
investors are likely to consider both (i) the brand’s
ability to stimulate licensee product sales (and thus
generate higher royalties for the licensor) and (ii) the
Table 5 Sensitivity Analyses
Panel A
After dropping outliers Using different models to estimate DV
Residuals in ±1 percentile Residuals in ±5 percentile Fama and French (1992) model Value-weighted model Market model
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Outcome equation
Brand Advertising −00429∗∗∗ −00345∗∗∗ −00308∗∗∗ −00308∗∗∗ −00004∗∗∗
Investments
Brand Fit 00874∗∗ 00805∗∗ 00730∗∗ 00629∗ 00006∗
Brand Breadth 00422∗∗∗ 00411∗∗∗ 00292∗∗ 00326∗∗ 00003∗∗
Firm Size 00173∗∗∗ 00134∗∗ 00132∗∗ 00111∗ 00001∗∗
Firm Licensing Experience −00012 00043 −00006 −00033 00000
Product Fit −00172 −00012 −00174 −00199 −00002
Corporate Brand or Not −00451∗ −00210 −00281 −00239 −00003
Estimated Brand Equity 00210 00406∗∗ 00213 00296∗ 00003∗
Prior Brand Licensing −00031 −00102∗∗ −00062 −00031 −00001∗
Categories
Firm Licensing Revenue −00703∗ −00225 −00377 −00161 −00002
Disclosure
Firm Earnings −10407∗∗ −00972∗ −10267∗ −00773 −00008
Licensee Licensing −00049∗∗ −00008 −00020 −00029 00000
Experience
Publicly Listed Licensee −00596∗∗ −00582∗∗∗ −00474∗∗ −00465∗∗ −00004∗
Foreign-Based Licensee 00447∗∗ 00490∗∗ 00429∗∗ 00395 00004∗
Industry Dummy 1 −10176∗∗∗ −10168∗∗∗ −00958∗∗∗ −00870∗∗∗ −00010∗∗∗
Industry Dummy 2 −10304∗∗ −10355∗∗∗ −00851∗∗ −00477 −00007∗
Industry Dummy 3 −10095∗∗ −00783∗∗ −00932∗∗ −00660∗ −00008∗
Industry Dummy 4 −10062∗∗ −10013∗∗∗ −10054∗∗∗ −00662∗∗ −00009∗∗
Constant 20540∗∗∗ 10699∗∗∗ 10890∗∗∗ 10370∗∗∗ 00019∗∗∗
Selection equation
Brand Advertising 00145∗∗∗ 00152∗∗∗ 00145∗∗∗ 00146∗∗∗ 00144∗∗∗
Investments
Brand Breadth 00347∗∗∗ 00325∗∗ 00354∗∗∗ 00352∗∗∗ 00356∗∗∗
Firm Size −00158∗∗ −00142∗∗ −00172∗∗ −00171∗∗ −00172∗∗
Whether Firm Previously 20109∗∗∗ 20131∗∗∗ 20129∗∗∗ 20129∗∗∗ 20126∗∗∗
Licensed a Brand
Corporate Brand or Not 00818∗∗∗ 00833∗∗∗ 00798∗∗∗ 00798∗∗∗ 00797∗∗∗
Estimated Brand Equity 00298∗ 00285∗ 00298∗ 00297∗ 00301∗
Firm Earnings 10316∗ 10115∗ 10525∗∗ 10520∗∗ 10531∗∗
Firm Leverage 00180 00196 00171 00183 00161
Firm Liquidity −00155∗ −00138∗ −00157∗ −00156∗ −00158∗∗
Constant −30476∗∗∗ −30558∗∗∗ −30475∗∗∗ −30477∗∗∗ −30472∗∗∗
 −00196 00018 −00149 −000491 −00278∗∗
N4n5 167 (1,566) 154 (1,553) 171 (1,570) 171 (1,570) 171 (1,570)
Wald chi-square (18) 143085∗∗∗ 161099∗∗∗ 113097∗∗∗ 101079∗∗∗ 102031∗∗∗
licensor firm’s ability to limit licensee opportunism
(and thus limit brand dilution and its adverse effect
on sales of other products marketed under the brand
name). We use this theoretical framework (Figure 1) to
develop and test five hypotheses that aim to explain
licensors’ abnormal returns following brand licensing
announcements.
5.1. Findings and Implications
We find that brand licensing announcements are associ-
ated with the generation of significant economic value
for licensors on average; the average abnormal return
on the day of announcement is positive and statistically
significant (0.33%; p < 00001). For the licensors examined
in our study, this translates into an average increase of
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Table 5 (Continued)
Panel B
Using alternative measures Using alternative Using alternative standard errors
abnormal returns
Firm-level window (011) Robust Jackknife Bootstrapped
Firm size Firm size Firm size brand Clustering at standard standard standard
(total assets) (market cap.) (employees) equity SIC 2-digits errors errors errors
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Outcome equation
Brand Advertising −00382∗∗∗ −00387∗∗∗ −00389∗∗∗ −00527∗∗∗ −00601∗∗∗ −00418∗∗∗ −00418∗∗∗ −00418∗∗∗ −00418∗∗∗
Investments
Brand Fit 00770∗∗ 00771∗∗ 00772∗∗ 00863∗∗ 00474 00791∗∗∗ 00791∗∗∗ 00791∗∗ 00791∗∗
Brand Breadth 00386∗∗ 00365∗∗ 00358∗∗ 00411∗∗∗ 00374∗ 00378∗∗ 00378∗∗ 00378∗∗ 00378∗∗
Firm Size 00135∗∗ 00128∗∗ 00136∗∗ 00320∗∗∗ 00365∗∗ 00195∗∗ 00195∗∗ 00195∗∗ 00195∗
Firm Licensing Experience −00049 −00044 −00040 −00033 −00045 −00042 −00042 −00042 −00042
Product Fit −00251 −00257 −00248 −00280 −00007 −00248 −00248 −00248 −00248
Corporate Brand or Not −00466∗ −00485∗ −00469 −00382 −00393 −00425∗ −00425 −00425 −00425
Estimated Brand Equity 00284∗ 00285∗ 00245 10031∗∗ −00427 00238∗ 00238 00238 00238
Prior Brand Licensing −00025 −00020 −00021 −00002 −00157∗∗ −00018 −00018 −00018 −00018
Categories
Firm Licensing Revenue −00293 −00348 −00284 −00370 00146 −00324 −00324 −00324 −00324
Disclosure
Firm Earnings −00769 −10026∗ −00941 −00858 −30477∗∗ −10393∗∗ −10393 −10393 −10393
Licensee Licensing Experience −00041∗ −00040∗ −00038 −00031 00001 −00039 −00039 −00039 −00039
Publicly Listed Licensee −00551∗∗ −00573∗∗ −00557∗∗ −00640∗∗ −00769∗ −00568∗∗∗ −00568∗∗ −00568∗∗ −00568∗∗
Foreign-Based Licensee 00474∗∗ 00482∗∗ 00467∗∗ 00535∗∗ 00760∗∗ 00491∗∗ 00491∗∗ 00491∗∗ 00491∗
Industry Dummy 1 −10081∗∗∗ −00977∗∗ −10221∗∗∗ −10469∗∗∗ −00667 −10250∗∗∗ −10250∗∗ −10250∗ −10250∗
Industry Dummy 2 −00857 −00739 −00927 −10327∗∗ 00038 −00979∗ −00979 −00979 −00979
Industry Dummy 3 −00922∗ −00757 −10034∗ −10255∗∗ −00578 −10094∗ −10094∗ −10094 −10094
Industry Dummy 4 −00932∗∗ −00821∗ −10067∗∗ −10531∗∗∗ −00382 −10110∗∗ −10110∗ −10110 −10110
Constant 20049∗∗∗ 20069∗∗∗ 20198∗∗∗ 20439∗∗∗ 20189∗∗ 20205∗∗∗ 20205∗∗∗ 20205∗∗ 20205∗∗
Selection equation
Brand Advertising 00140∗∗∗ 00158∗∗∗ 00145∗∗∗ 00175∗∗∗ 00136∗∗∗ 00145∗∗∗ 00145∗∗∗ 00145∗∗∗ 00145∗∗∗
Investments
Brand Breadth 00355∗∗∗ 00348∗∗∗ 00376∗∗∗ 00367∗∗∗ 00348∗∗∗ 00355∗∗∗ 00355∗∗∗ 00355∗∗∗ 00355∗∗∗
Firm Size −00115∗ −00189∗∗∗ −00185∗∗∗ −00161∗ −00171∗∗ −00172∗∗ −00172∗∗∗ −00172∗∗∗ −00172∗∗∗
Whether Firm Previously 20088∗∗∗ 20170∗∗∗ 20068∗∗∗ 20110∗∗∗ 20155∗∗∗ 20129∗∗∗ 20129∗∗∗ 20129∗∗∗ 20129∗∗∗
Licensed a Brand
Corporate Brand or Not 00818∗∗∗ 00726∗∗∗ 00784∗∗∗ 00855∗∗∗ 00803∗∗∗ 00796∗∗∗ 00796∗∗∗ 00796∗∗∗ 00796∗∗∗
Estimated Brand Equity 00257∗ 00280∗ 00355∗∗ −00086 00324∗∗ 00297∗∗ 00297∗∗ 00297∗∗ 00297∗∗
Firm Earnings 00773 10495∗∗ 10584∗∗ 10408∗ 10548∗∗ 10531∗∗ 10531∗∗∗ 10531∗∗ 10531∗∗
Firm Leverage 00163 00047 00189 00179 00161 00175 00175∗∗ 00175∗∗ 00175∗∗
Firm Liquidity −00145∗ −00165∗∗ −00177∗∗ −00155∗ −00158∗∗ −00157∗ −00157∗∗∗ −00157∗∗∗ −00157∗∗∗
Constant −30450∗∗∗ −30492∗∗∗ −30439∗∗∗ −30528∗∗∗ −30485∗∗∗ −30476∗∗∗ −30476∗∗∗ −30476∗∗∗ −30476∗∗∗
P −00165 −00203∗ −00167 −00217 −00537∗∗ −00172 −00172 −00172 −00172
Wald chi-square (18) 890260∗∗∗ 810740∗∗∗ 980790∗∗∗ 910930∗∗∗ 420050∗∗∗ 2580460∗∗∗ 460270∗∗∗ 10800∗∗∗ 320380∗∗∗
Notes. Coeff., coefficient; N4n5, number of observations pertaining to the outcome (selection) equation (171 (1,570)); Industry Dummy 1, apparel, footwear, and
jewelry; Industry Dummy 2, printing, chemicals, and rubber; Industry Dummy 3, communications, transportation, and entertainment; Industry Dummy 4, games,
sports, and retail furniture.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001 (one-tailed).
$37.52 million in market capitalization.9 This is compa-
rable to the economic impact of announcements of Inter-
net channel additions (£16.38 million, per Geyskens et al.
2002) and new product introductions ($26.68 million,
per Chaney et al. 1991). In percentage terms, the average
increase in shareholder value following brand licensing
announcements (0.33%) is similar in magnitude to
the increase following announcements of brand exten-
sions (0.32%, per Lane and Jacobson 1995), celebrity
9 The dollar value of abnormal returns of each firm is calculated
by multiplying the abnormal return of the firm by its market
capitalization at the close of the day before the brand licensing
announcement.
endorsements (0.54%, per Agrawal and Kamakura
1995), and Internet channel additions (0.35% and 0.71%,
per Geyskens et al. 2002).
However, there is substantial variation in the returns
obtained by licensors. For example, Clorox’s share-
holder value increased by $299.31 million in June 2001
after it announced an agreement to license its Armor All
Professional brand to National Services Industries for
car wash products. In contrast, Columbia Sportswear’s
shareholder value decreased by nearly $37.89 million
in December 2001 after it announced an agreement
to license its Columbia brand to Icon Shoe Care for
shoe care products and laces. Firms in our sample that
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realized positive returns had a mean abnormal return
of 1.00% (an average gain of $105 million in shareholder
wealth),10 whereas firms that realized negative returns
had a mean abnormal return of −0050% (an average
loss of $45.16 million in shareholder wealth).11
The incidence of negative abnormal returns in our
sample is high—as many as 44% of brand licensing
announcements are followed by negative abnormal
returns.12 This suggests that based on the publicly
available information at the time of brand licensing
announcements, investors expect net reductions in
licensor cash flows in nearly half the cases. This raises
important questions: What factors lead to positive
versus negative abnormal returns, and what can licen-
sors do to generate more favorable returns? Why
do so many brand licensing announcements in our
sample (i.e., 44%) lead to negative abnormal returns?
Our findings offer the following insights into these
questions.
We find that investors react more favorably to the
licensing of a brand when there is a greater fit between
the brand’s image and a licensee’s product (i.e., when
there is a greater “brand fit”). This finding suggests
that licensors would reap greater benefits if they first
identify products that fit best with their brands’ images
and then look for brand licensing agreements for these
products. On the other hand, investors do not appear
to care very much about how well a brand’s current
products fit with a licensee’s product (i.e., “product
fit”). Taken together, these findings suggest that a
brand manager considering licensing a brand should
give priority to the fit between a brand’s image and a
prospective licensee’s product (i.e., brand fit), and not
focus on the brand’s products and whether they fit
with a licensee’s product (i.e., product fit). We also find
that investors react more favorably to the licensing of
brands that are broader, i.e., used on a greater variety of
products. This suggests it may be useful for managers
to first try to broaden their brands via brand extensions
before offering them to licensees.
We find that abnormal returns following brand
licensing announcements are more positive when licen-
sors are larger in size. This finding lends credence
10 The average gain is statistically significant with p < 0001 in three
tests—the cross-section test 4t = 607795, the rank test 4Z = 501255, and
the jackknife test 4Z = 608135.
11 The average loss is statistically significant with p < 0001 in three
tests—the cross-section test 4t = −301205, the rank test 4Z = −204725,
and the jackknife test 4Z = −209605.
12 However, our finding is comparable to the incidence of negative
returns reported in previous event studies (56% for appointments
of chief marketing officers in Boyd et al. 2010, 36% and 42% for
Internet channel additions in Geyskens et al. 2002, 48.7% for customer
relationship management outsourcing in Kalaignanam et al. 2013,
and 46% for new product development outsourcing in Raassens
et al. 2012).
to the hypothesis that investors view larger licensors
as having more resources to prevent/limit licensee
opportunism that can dilute a brand and hurt sales of
other products marketed under the brand name. This
suggests that, all else being equal, bigger licensors are
at an advantage insofar as using brand licensing to
create shareholder value is concerned. We also find that
abnormal returns following brand licensing announce-
ments are unrelated to a firm’s licensing experience. This
finding appears to suggest that investors believe a licen-
sor’s prior experience in licensing provides insufficient
assurance that the licensor will be able to prevent/limit
licensee opportunism. Taken together, our findings
suggest that investors believe a licensor’s size is a
better signal of its ability to prevent/limit licensee
opportunism than the licensor’s licensing experience.
This may be viewed as “good news” for firms that
are interested in licensing their brands but lack prior
experience.
Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that licens-
ing announcements of brands with greater advertising
investments lead to lower abnormal returns. Based on
prior brand extension research (e.g., Broniarczyk and
Alba 1994, Loken et al. 2010), we had argued that
investors expect a heavily advertised brand to generate
greater licensee product sales and hence greater royal-
ties for the licensor. Although this may well be the
case, investors may also see a greater threat of lower
sales of other products marketed under the brand
name because of brand dilution, and believe that greater
expected royalties are unlikely to offset lower profits
expected from sales of other products. This explanation
is supported by two interrelated strands of reasoning.
First, greater advertising increases the accessibility of
a brand’s associations among consumers, making it
more likely that consumers will revise these associa-
tions downward in response to poor quality marketing
and/or manufacturing by an opportunistic licensee;
that is, investors are likely to perceive a greater threat
of brand dilution when a heavily advertised brand is
licensed (see Ahluwalia and Gürhan-Canli 2000 for sug-
gestive evidence in a brand extension setting). Second,
a licensor’s profits from sales of all products marketed
under its brand name generally are much greater than
its royalties on sales of a single product of a new
licensee. As such, investors are likely to believe that
the greater royalties earned from licensing a heavily
advertised brand will be insufficient to offset the lower
profits expected from lower sales of other products
because of brand dilution. This is also consistent with
prospect theory, which suggests potential losses tend to
be more salient to investors than potential gains (e.g.,
Barberis and Thaler 2003, Hwang and Satchell 2010).
As noted earlier, as many at 44% of brand licensing
announcements in our sample lead to negative abnor-
mal returns. This begs the question of why managers
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license brands that end up having negative abnormal
returns. Results from our selection equation estimation
offer some insights into this question. We find that
licensors are more (rather than less) likely to license
heavily advertised brands (coefficient = 00145, p < 0001;
see Table 4), even though investors react negatively
to such announcements. Similarly, smaller firms are
more likely to license their brands (coefficient = −00172,
p < 0001; see Table 4), even though investors react
negatively to such announcements. We offer three
possible explanations for firms’ decisions to license
heavily advertised brands, and smaller firms’ decisions
to license, which collectively offer insights into why so
many (44% in our sample) licensing announcements
lead to negative abnormal returns.
First, managers may be aware that licensing brands
with greater advertising investments and licensing by
smaller firms generate lower abnormal returns, but may
choose to license anyways to improve their short-term
performance. For example, heavily advertised brands
have greater consumer awareness, and hence licensing
such brands is likely to quickly generate licensee prod-
uct sales and licensor royalties. This would improve
managers’ performance on short-term metrics such as
quarterly revenues, on which managers are evaluated.
As such, managers may pay more attention to these
metrics than to stock prices, especially because they
have greater control over short-term revenues/earnings,
whereas stock prices are subject to a broader range of
influences (for related evidence of myopic behavior
by managers, see Mizik 2010). Similarly, small firms
tend to have fewer resources, and as such may value
immediate access to additional revenues from brand
licensing more than larger firms and deliberately trade
off stock valuations for greater cash flows.
Second, managers may choose to license heavily
advertised brands or to license even when they are
relatively small in size if they are privy to licensing
execution terms that may warrant greater optimism
regarding licensee opportunism and brand dilution.
For example, licensors may develop strategies for pre-
venting or limiting licensee opportunism, but not make
them public at the time of brand licensing announce-
ments; similarly, licensors may have private information
regarding the licensee and the terms of the contract that
indicate the threat of licensee opportunism is smaller
than what one might otherwise expect. If so, managers
are likely to perceive the threat from brand dilution to
be smaller than that perceived by investors.
Third, managers may well be unaware that licensing
heavily advertised brands or licensing by a smaller
firm is suboptimal for maximizing shareholder value.
Figuring out a licensor’s stock returns from a brand
licensing announcement on a given day requires
attributing the change in stock prices that day to the
announcement from among a host of other factors such
as shocks affecting the overall market, the general trend
in the licensor’s stock price, and other confounding
events or actions the licensor may have taken that day.
Moreover, managers tend to focus on their own stock
prices; they are unlikely to systematically track brand
licensing announcements of other firms along with
changes in their stock prices as well as characteristics
of the brands, licensors, and licensees involved. These
difficulties may keep managers from realizing that
licensing more heavily advertised brands and licensing
by smaller firms can result in lower returns.
These possibilities—managerial myopia, private infor-
mation, and lack of awareness—offer partial explana-
tions for why so many licensors enter into licensing
arrangements to which investors react unfavorably on
the day of the announcement. It would be useful to
investigate these possibilities in greater depth in future
research, not just in brand licensing contexts, but also
in other contexts, given that a large proportion of firms
that make announcements of various types experience
negative abnormal returns (e.g., Kalaignanam et al.
2013, Raasens et al. 2012).
5.2. Limitations and Future Research
Although we observe on average substantial abnormal
returns for a licensor on the day of a brand licensing
announcement, these gains in economic value represent
initial reactions of investors, conditional on the informa-
tion available to them at the time of the announcement.
As more information becomes available, it is possible
investors may adjust their initial estimates, and the
long-run value created for licensors’ shareholders may
differ from that suggested by our findings. Furthermore,
abnormal returns are near-instantaneous reactions of
investors, and may not capture potential longer-term
strategic benefits that may motivate firms to license
their brands. In addition, we use cross-sectional data
to explain variations in abnormal returns; as such, it
would be appropriate to exercise caution when making
strong causal inferences from the study’s results.
Our study uses publicly available data to assess the
effects of brand licensing announcements on licensor
shareholder value. It would be useful to complement
this study with studies using different methodological
approaches to examine a broader range of benefits real-
ized by licensors (which may not always be disclosed
in licensing announcements). For example, it would be
useful to develop grounded theory followed by surveys
to assess the impact of specific elements of licensing
contracts (such as scope, duration, and comprehen-
siveness of an agreement) on a variety of benefits
realized by a licensor (e.g., competitive blocking, brand
building).
We focus on announcements of licensing agree-
ments involving a single brand to establish a clear link
between brand characteristics and investor responses.
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However, in the course of our data collection efforts,
we also identified licensing announcements listing
multiple brands. For example, Samsonite Corpora-
tion announced licensing agreements for Samsonite
and American Tourister, to two licensees in a sin-
gle announcement in 2000. It would be interesting
to examine in future studies whether investors view
multiple brands as portfolios, and consider the number
of brands licensed and number of product segments in
which the brands are offered when determining the
value of a licensor’s stock.
Future research could also examine investor res-
ponses to voluntary disclosures of licensing revenues
by licensors in their earnings announcements. For
example, do investors respond more positively to earn-
ings announcements containing such disclosures given
that these licensing revenues represent positive cash
flows? Or, alternatively, are investors wary of the poten-
tial negative effects of brand licensing when licensed
brands are heavily advertised or when the licensors are
small, and therefore respond less positively to earnings
announcements containing such disclosures?
Finally, it would be useful to examine the brand
licensing phenomenon from the perspective of licensees.
Entering into a brand licensing arrangement enables a
licensee to take advantage of a brand’s associations
to generate higher sales of its products, thus likely
increasing its shareholder value. It would be useful to
empirically investigate whether and to what extent this
actually is the case. Relatedly, it would be interesting
Appendix B. Distribution of Licensing Agreements and Abnormal Returns by Industry
Number of brand Average abnormal
Industry (two-digit SIC) licensing agreements Percentage returns (%) SD
Apparel, footwear, and jewelry (23131151159) 116 67.836 0.205 1.629
Printing, chemicals, and rubber (27128130138) 23 13.450 0.593 1.275
Communications, transportation, and 11 6.433 0.372 0.928
entertainment (35136137148170179)
Games, sports, and retail furniture (25139158) 11 6.433 0.075 1.142
Business services (67172) 10 5.848 1.500 2.236
Total 171 100 0.33 1.58
Note. SD, standard deviation.
Appendix C. Examples of Brand Fit Measurement
Brand descriptions in Brand descriptions in
Brand descriptions in company press releases trade press articles Licensee Brand
Brand Year annual report (for validation purposes) (for validation purposes) product fit
UGG Australia 2004 Luxury brand of sheepskin footwear;
functional as well as premium, luxury
collection; embraced by Hollywood
celebrities, often photographed wearing
the brand
Premier sheepskin footwear;
growing status in the luxury
goods sector
Fur lined outdoorsy boots;
existing potential and skillful
interest
Outerwear 3
Verizon 2006 Leading provider of communications
services; wireless voice and data
products and services; the most
extensive wireless networks
Leader in delivering broadband
and other communication
innovations; most reliable
wireless network, premier
wireline networks
Major cell phone operator; local
and long distance services;
wired and wireless access
networks; telecom behemoth
Headsets 1
to study the types of brands and licensors for which
licensees are willing to pay higher royalty rates. For
example, do licensees prefer larger, more dominant
licensors that have greater market power and hence
potentially can help out licensees (e.g., help them get
access to preferred shelf spaces in grocery stores)? Or
are licensees wary of such firms because their market
power can limit the flexibility with which licensees
can promote their products bearing the brand name?
Addressing these and other similar questions is likely
to lead to richer insights into the underresearched topic
of brand licensing.
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Appendix A. Distribution of Brand Licensing
Announcements by Year
Number of brand
Year licensing agreements Percentage
1999 4 2.34
2000 14 8.19
2001 20 11.70
2002 17 9.94
2003 36 21.05
2004 38 22.22
2005 26 15.20
2006 16 9.36
Total 171 100
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Appendix D. Examples of Product Fit Measurement
Brand’s product Licensee Product
Brand Year Brand’s product categories (source: USPTO) prototype product fit
UGG Australia 2004 Footwear (boots, shoes, clogs, slippers) and footwear made of sheepskin
Clothing (coats, jackets, ponchos, skirts, muffs; children’s buntings, T-shirts,
sweatshirts, shirts, hats, gloves)
Sheepskin handbags, carry-on bags, clutch bags, duffle bags, shoulder bags,
tote bags, backpacks, daypacks, handbags, knapsacks, pocketbooks, purses,
satchels and waist packs
Cleaner and conditioner, water and stain repellant for use on sheepskin and
leather
Retail store services, mail order catalog services and online retail store
services featuring footwear, clothing, handbags and home accessories
Apparel, accessories, and
luggage
Outerwear 2.33
Verizon 2006 Telecommunications services, namely, transmission of voice, data, images,
audio, etc., via a communications network
Telecommunications and information technology equipment, components,
supplies, etc.
Telephone directory services
Providing news in the nature of current events reporting and entertainment
information via global communications networks
Hosting the webpages of others on a computer server for a global computer
network
Electronics and
telecommunication
services networks
Headsets 2.53
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